As reported by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the fire aboard the Staten Island Ferry Sandy Ground in December 2022 was caused by engine design flaws and inadequate training of engineering crewmembers.
The incident, which took place in New York Harbor, resulted in $12.7 million in damages but no loss of life thanks to the crew’s actions and the assistance of good samaritan vessels.
The fire broke out in the engine room of the ferry while it was carrying 884 passengers between Staten Island and Manhattan.
According to the NTSB, oilers aboard the Sandy Ground closed both day tank fuel oil return isolation ball valves, causing overpressurization of the fuel oil system.
This led to the rupture of fuel oil filters on the main engines, which sprayed fuel oil and ignited a fire.
The NTSB’s investigation revealed significant design flaws in the Ollis-class ferries, including the lack of unimpeded fuel oil return flow or pressure relief valves in the fuel oil system.
These ferries, built for the New York City Department of Transportation, were modified after delivery with fuel oil return isolation valves, which inadvertently created a risk of overpressurization.
In response, the NTSB issued five safety recommendations.
These include suggested regulatory changes to diesel engine fuel oil return systems to ensure either unimpeded return flow or the installation of pressure relief valves.
The NTSB also recommended that the Coast Guard develop interim design guidance to prevent similar incidents on new construction vessels.
The NTSB also found that engineering crewmembers lacked adequate training on the modified fuel systems of the new Ollis-class ferries.
The installation of fuel oil return isolation ball valves was not accompanied by necessary follow-on training.
As a result, crewmembers were unaware of the overpressurization risks associated with the new system design.
The NTSB highlighted that similar issues contributed to a 2021 engine room fire on a towing vessel on the Mississippi River.
This underscores the importance of proper training and understanding of fuel oil system designs to prevent overpressurization and potential fires.
In addition to its recommendations to the Coast Guard, the NTSB suggested that the American Bureau of Shipping propose similar design requirements to the International Association of Classification Societies.
These measures aim to enhance the safety of diesel engine fuel oil return systems on U.S.-flagged vessels and ensure the safe operation of ships globally.
